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Abstract
The idea of African epistemology just like the larger 
discourse of African philosophy (especially in its early 
beginnings) still faces some challenges. One of the 
challenges centers on the proper meaning and adequacy 
of the idea. No doubt this difficulty has instigated 
some misgivings about the discourse prompting some 
philosophers to either reject it outright or accept it with 
reservations. I believe that part of the misgivings of 
African epistemology borders on the meaning ascribed 
to it by the advocates of the concept which is fluid and 
inappropriate with the present realities of Africans in their 
interaction with the rest of the world.
Part of our business in this paper is to dispel this 
unfortunate attitude and perception towards African 
epistemology through a careful reconstruction and 
delineation of the meaning and nature of African 
epistemology in a way that accords with the true situation 
of Africans and as such reflects their correct ontological 
and epistemological conceptualization. This is buttressed 
by some insights drawn from Igbo traditional thought 
system which in all intents and purposes chimes with 
other epistemological systems elsewhere.
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1.  AFRICAN EPISTEMOLOGY AND 
ONTOLOGY, EARLY DISCOURSES
Roughly speaking, the idea of an African epistemology 
as understood by those who propose it is taken as a way 
the African conceptualizes, interprets and apprehends 
reality within the context of African cultural or collective 
experience (Anyanwu, 1983, p.60). The idea of African 
epistemology is based on their (its advocates) acceptance 
that such concepts as knowledge, truth, rationality etc. 
can be interpreted using African categories and concepts 
as provided by the African cultural experience without a 
recourse to Western or alien conceptual framework. Thus 
this epistemology is abstracted from the collective world-
view of Africans and leaning essentially on such materials 
as myths, folklores, proverbs, folk wisdom etc..
It is important to note that the discourse of African 
epistemology can be subdivided into two phases; namely 
its early beginnings and later attempts. In its early 
beginnings, the scholars whose works are associated 
or linked with this view, who were mostly religious 
clerics and theologians include, Placide Tempels, Bantu 
Philosophy (1959); E. Bolaji Idowu, Olodumare: God in 
Yoruba Belief (1962); W. E. Abraham, The Mind of Africa 
(1966); J. B. Danquah, The Akan Doctrine of God (968); 
John S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy (1969) 
among others. The intention of these scholars was to argue 
that African epistemology or way of knowing flows from 
African ontology and ultimately to establish that Africans 
had an idea of God even before Europeans came to Africa, 
apparently refuting the so-called civilizing mission of the 
Europeans with its dominant ideology which ascribed a 
pre-logical mental frame to the Africans and other non-
Western peoples during the hay day of colonialism.
This early discourse of African epistemology 
attempted to link the African mode of knowledge with 
African ontology. In other words both are intimately 
related making it inconceivable to understand one 
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without a prior knowledge of the other. Onyewuenyi, an 
African philosopher from Nigeria and defender of African 
epistemology, argues that African theory of knowledge 
follows closely upon ontology (Onyewuenyi, 1976, p.525). 
He goes further by saying that True wisdom, according 
to Tempels, who pioneered the discourse of African 
epistemology, lies in ontological knowledge, it is the 
intelligence of forces, of their hierarchy, their cohesion 
and their interaction (Ibid). It is in this direction that 
Tempels’ (1959, p.21) explication of Bantu philosophy 
and ontology, where he attempted to show that reality 
in Africa is invested with “life or vital-force” features 
prominently in the formulation of African epistemology. 
This view tends to suggest that an understanding of the 
African mode of knowledge should pay due attention 
to the background of African spiritualistic and dynamic 
metaphysics. Perhaps this is what John Mbiti (1969, p.1) 
had in mind when he made the now discredited statement 
that “Africans are notoriously religious’ because of their 
extreme emotional and mystical disposition, and also by 
virtue of their insertion into an organic environment.
Even much earlier than Mbiti, Tempels, as discussed 
above, had stated that the idea of force was central to the 
life and world view of the Bantu. In fact, the Bantu cannot 
conceive of being without its attributes, force. Hence, he 
surmised that reality in Bantu in particular and Africa in 
general is enmeshed in the idea of force. As he stated
I believe that we should most faithfully render the Bantu 
thought in European language by saying that Bantu speak, act, 
live as if, for them, beings were forces, force is not for them 
an adventitious, accidental reality. Force is even more than a 
necessary attribute of beings. Force is the nature of being, force 
is being, being is force (Tempels, 1959, p.35).
Even though Tempels’s analysis of Bantu Philosophy is 
criticized and even rejected by some African philosophers 
and scholars as not being a true reflection of an indigenous 
African thought system, and unwittingly justifying the 
alleged difference between European and African as 
arrogantly stated by earlier European anthropologists and 
given philosophical impetus by some philosophers, its 
import can hardly be missed which according to Abiola 
Irele (1998, p.110) “provided the model and conceptual 
framework for the construction of an original African 
philosophy and has remained a central reference of 
philosophical debate in Africa”.
However, Tempels’s propositions have been challenged 
by an indigenous African scholar, Alexis Kagame (1966, 
pp.10-20) who set out not only to critically verify and 
reformulate Tempels’s claims concerning Bantu ontology, 
but also to bring it in line with the present realities of 
Bantu (Africa) Kagame, while appealing to Aristotle’s 
categories in disclosing the epistemological basis of Bantu 
world-view using their linguistic codes or idioms, outlined 
“four fundamental categories of Bantu thought” namely; 
Muntu or Man (i.e being endowed with intelligence); 
Kintu or animals, plants (i.e being without intelligence); 
hantu or space or time and kuntu or modality. Thus, 
Kagame argued hat those terms were indicative of 
implicit thought processes and vehicles of an explicitly 
philosophical discourse based upon terms in the Rwandan 
oral tradition” (Cf. Irele, 1998, p.111).
Now the Tempelsian notion of vital-force is echoed in 
the epistemology implicit in Senghor’s negritude -a term 
which both he and Aime Cesaire of Martinique regarded 
as representing in a functional sense, the effort of the 
Negro-African to recover for himself and for Africans 
in Diaspora, a self-pride and confidence shattered for 
centuries by the adventure of the colonizer and the 
resulting political and cultural devaluation. Senghor was 
not too consistent in his definition of negritude, in one 
sense, it is taken as “a metaphysics of a black identity, an 
African personality and a black soul,” In another sense, 
it designates “a kind of epistemological anthropology 
and a political philosophy (Wiredu, 1998, p.98). Thus if 
all these are weaved together, it comes down to a single 
definition of negritude by Senghor (1964, p.72) as “the 
sum total of the values of the civilization of the African 
world. What is obvious from the views of the negritude 
theorists is a strong defense and affirmation of African 
values and civilization. This idea is reverberated in 
Alioune Diop’s definition of negritude as ‘the complete 
ensemble of values of African culture and the vindication 
of the dignity of persons of African descent. (Cf. W-Allen, 
1962, p.30).
Again, what Senghor intends to achieve with his theory 
of negritude is now crystal clear when the theory is taken 
to be a kind of systematic exposition of the values of 
traditional Africa as they are embodied in thought systems 
and mentality as well as social institutions of the Negro-
African. According to Senghor, at the epistemological 
level, there is a preponderance of African’s exhibition of 
strong sensibility and emotional disposition. The African, 
apart from his affective participation in the object, does 
not draw a clear-cut distinction between himself and the 
object, or as Senghor (1964, p.72) unequivocally stated, 
“ he (African) does not hold it at a distance, nor does he 
merely look at it and analyse it, as the European would 
do; rather he touches it, feels it, smells it.” Senghor 
argues that the emotive response of the African is an act 
of cognition in which the subject and object enter into an 
organic and dynamic relationship and in which intense 
perception through the senses culminates in the conscious 
apprehension of reality. As he remarks:
…the Negro-African sympathizes, abandons his personality to 
become identified with the other, dies to be reborn in the other. 
He does not assimilate: he is assimilated. He lives a common 
life with the other; he lives in a symbiosis’(Ibid.).
Actually, Senghor argues that modes of knowledge or 
forms of thought as constituted by each race are different 
since they are rooted in the psycho-physiological make-up 
of each race.
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Thus the Cartesian dictum: “I think therefore I am” is 
inapplicable to the African who will rather say “I smell, 
I dance the other, I am”, according to Senghor. Based 
on the African Sensual participation in the object, which 
Senghor acknowledged as ‘the best mode of knowledge’ 
he unavowedly proclaimed that “Emotion is African as 
Reason is Hellenic. (Cf. Irele, 1983, p.18). No one is left 
in doubt that Senghor was prepared to allow two forms of 
reason between European and African. Whereas European 
reason, according to him, is analytical, African reason is 
intuitive. Senghor (1965, pp.33-34) further avers that
The life-surge of the African, his self-abandonment to the other 
is thus actuated by reason. But here, reason is not the eye- reason 
of the European, it is the reason by embrace which partakes 
more of the nature of logos than ratio... classical European 
reason is analytical and makes use of the object, African reason 
is intuitive and participates in the object.
As it is expected, Senghor’s claim that “European 
reasoning is analytical, discursive by utilization, 
African reasoning is intuitive by participation”, though 
contradictory and ambivalent, no doubt generated a lot of 
controversy and odium from African intellectuals who felt 
thoroughly embarrassed by such reckless statement which 
has no basis in experience and theory. The untoward 
consequences of Senghor’s statement above are obvious. 
Apart from denying Africans any capacity for engagement 
in rational discourse and a reduction of the African 
mode of knowledge to sensuality and emotion, it also 
unwittingly justifies, in a poetic manner, Levy-Bruhl’s 
ascription of child - like and ‘pre-logical mental frame to 
the Africans. 
Nonetheless, in the face of criticisms and challenges to 
Senghor’s position by African intellectuals, he retorted by 
saying, apparently modifying his earlier claim of Africans 
incapacity for discursive and critical analysis,
…in truth, every ethnic group possesses different aspects of 
reason and all virtues of man but each has stressed only one 
aspect of reason, only certain virtues. No civilization can be built 
without techniques. Negro African civilization is no exception to 
this rule (Ibid, p.75).
Senghor even argues that the Negro-African method of 
knowledge is traditionally dialectical and akin to the three 
main laws of thought in logic namely; the principles of 
identity; non-contradiction and excluded middle.
2.  AFRICAN EPISTEMOLOGY, LATER 
DISCUSSION
Turning to the recent discussion or analysis of African 
epistemology, we see some African scholars and 
professional philosophers engaged in the conceptualization 
and theorization of African epistemology as opposed 
to the earlier attempt which was dominated mainly by 
theologians and poets. Now two approaches are proposed 
here for the study of African epistemology. One of these 
uses Western concepts and categories to interpret African 
experience. The other, relativist in orientation and outlook, 
attempts to study African epistemic system adopting 
African culture, concepts and categories. What the African 
philosophers who use the first approach do is to seek for 
African equivalent of some Western concepts and graft 
same into African experience. For instance, the rationalist 
and empiricist theories of knowledge are accepted by the 
advocates of this view as applicable to Fanti, Yoruba and 
Igbo philosophy etc. In other words, both reason and sense 
experience, notable sources of knowledge in western 
philosophy, are taken to give knowledge about African 
reality. However this approach is criticized, particularly 
by P. K. Roy (1986, p.1) who argues that it is not enough 
to show how certain African belief, for example in 
innate principles or ideas supports rationalism, but to 
demonstrate through critical analysis and “argumentative 
approach how such belief is used or arrived at by the Fanti 
or Yoruba or Igbo.
One of the major contributions to the discourse of 
African epistemology is Robin Horton’s (1967, pp.155-
187) classic paper “African Traditional Thought and 
Western Science,” where he argues that African religious 
ideas have some explanatory models as that of the 
scientific ones. In other words, pre-colonial African 
religious ideas could be “understood as constituting a body 
of theory whose fundamental aim, like that of Western 
science, were explanation, prediction and control of the 
phenomena of everyday life” (Cf. Appiah, 1998, p.117).
Horton’s real intention was to avoid the ethnocentrism 
characteristic of earlier anthropologists and to place 
African traditional thought on the same explanatory 
pedestals with Western scientific cultures against the 
intellectualists who have ascribed primitive and pre-
logical mental frame to the non-Western peoples and to 
some extent the symbolists who accepted that traditional 
beliefs were “symbolically rational and true”. He, 
however, argues that what distinguishes, scientific theory 
from African traditional thought is that the former appeals 
to non-personal and inanimate objects exemplified 
in theoretical entities like atoms and molecules in its 
explanation of phenomena, while the latter bases its 
explanation of reality on personal and human agencies 
typified in human beings, gods and spirits. Another 
distinguishing feature of African and Western scientific 
cultures according to Horton, (1993, p.223) lies in the 
fact that African thought is closed while Western science 
is ‘open’ apparently articulating Karl Popper’s ‘open and 
closed societies’ predicament to show that a closed society 
is characterized by “a lack of awareness of alternatives, 
sacredness of beliefs and anxiety about threats to them”’ 
and whereas in open society or system, there is a highly 
developed awareness of alternatives, and less threatened 
or worried by the possibility of change.
A significant work of Wiredu, which is germane for 
our discussion here is his paper ‘The Concept of Truth 
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in the Akan Language’. Here, Wiredu tries to elucidate 
the epistemology of the Akan using the concept of truth. 
He discusses the Akan rendition of truth from its moral 
and cognitive aspects. But it seems the former is more 
noticeable amongst the Akans than the latter. Hence the 
Akan word nokware translates the English truthfulness, 
rather than truth and its opposite nkontompo which 
translates lies instead of falsity in English language. 
According to Wiredu (1985, pp.43-55) ‘the Akan has 
correlated the word truth with a primarily moral rather 
than cognitive concept of truth in the Akan langauge 
Wiredu adduces three reasons for this complication 
as firstly, the main pre-occupation with truth in the 
traditional Akan society was moral, secondly, the moral 
concept of truth presupposes the cognitive concept of truth 
and thirdly, the English word truth itself is ambiguous 
(Ibid). It is pointless going into controversy with Wiredu 
since the writer does not understand Akan language, 
but it is Wiredu’s argument that both moral comment 
or connotation and communal unanimity or agreement 
embedded in truth by the Akans is an epistemological 
aberration (Ibid, pp.44-45). But it seems that the cognitive 
aspect of the concept of truth in Akan is fraught with some 
problems, since according to Wiredu,
…here we meet with a remarkable fact, which is that there is 
no one word in Akan for truth. To say that something is true the 
Akans simply say it is so, and truth is rendered as what is so... 
This concept they express by nea ete saa, a proposition which is 
so.(Ibid, p.46).
Now Wiredu’s claims have been disputed by J. T. 
Bedu-Addo, a fellow speaker of the Akan Language. 
Bedu-Addo’s critique of Wiredu, it seems, centers on 
two points namely; language evolution and linguistic 
conventions in natural language. Bedu-Addo discounts 
Wiredu’s view that in Akan the opposite of nokware 
(truth) is nkontompo (lies), not falsity as we find in 
English by arguing that it may be correct to say that, at 
the moment the Akans may not have one word for what is 
not true (false), but the Akans have and indeed say “enye 
nokwarè” meaning it is not true which can also be used 
to convey ‘eye nkon tompo’ (it is a lie). Again, it is his 
contention that
…in Akan, statements that are nkontompo (lies) constitute 
a sub-set within the set of statements that are said not to be 
nokware; just as in English, lies constitute a sub-set of the set of 
statements that are said not to be true (Bedu-Aud0, 1985, p.72).
Also Bedu-Addo controverts Wiredu’s rejection of the 
“oneness of voice” that is purported to be involved in the 
word nokware by reinterpreting it “as a purely linguistic 
phenomenon that does not involve any epistemological 
aberration on the part of the Akan (Ibid, p.73). In the same 
vein, he maintains that the Akan notion of ‘being so’ or 
what is supports not only the correspondence theory of 
truth but also the ‘picture theory of meaning’. He argues, 
contrary to Wiredu, who had alluded that in Akan there 
is not a single word standing for the English fact that 
what resembles the fact is the image produced by the 
use of the words in the minds of people who understand 
the language, that is, to say if the statement “it is raining 
heavily” is true if it corresponds to a fact, but false if it 
fails to correspond to a fact or state of affairs or situation 
(Ibid, p.80).
Another contribution to the literature on African 
epistemology and/or philosophy is Barry Hallen’s and 
J. O. Sodipo’s (1986) classic book “Knowledge, Belief 
and Witchcraft,” where they attempt, in their words, to 
conceptually analyse three key words or concepts central 
to Yoruba thought. These are aje, imo and igbagbo which 
putatively translate in English witchcraft, knowledge 
and belief respectively. However imo (knowledge and 
igbagbo (belief) will interest us here since they bear on 
Yoruba propositional knowledge. Hallen and Sodipo, 
following W.V.O. Quine’s distinction between observation 
and standing sentence, argue that the Yoruba make a 
distinction between knowledge and belief or opinion. 
According to them, whereas imo is derived through a 
first-hand information, observation and sense-experience 
and is capable of being verified, confirmed of falsified, 
igbagbo on the other hand, is gotten through second-hand 
information, though could later become imo after rigorous 
empirical testing, confirmation and verification etc..
In terms of ranking, knowledge in Yoruba is based 
on sensory perception, particularly visual perception (i.e 
irirn) of the external world. In other words what someone 
sees, when conjoined with cognitive activities or mind (i.e 
eriokon) like understanding, comprehension, judgment, 
consciousness, then propositions pertaining to such 
experience are regarded as true (i.e ooto) (Hallen, 1998, 
p.832). Igbagbo, on the contrary, is based on second - 
hand information. Thus the evidence or justification for 
igbagbo is based on what one is taught in the course of a 
formal education, what one learns from books, the media, 
other people and oral tradition” (Ibid, p.833).
Now if someone’s imo (knowledge) or igbagbo 
(belief) is disputed, the first thing to do towards the 
resolution of the problem is to test the claims through 
empirical verification and justification. In other words 
some people may be invited to testify or give evidence 
on the matter. Of course the people invited to give 
evidence must be people of high moral integrity and good 
character (or iwa). The point being made here is that the 
evidence or explanation (i.e alaye) given by people of 
good character is more reliable than the one given by 
people of questionable character or even criminals. The 
approach adopted by Hallen and Sodipo in their research 
experiment, as they would regard their work rather 
than being called fieldwork, is to go into “collaborative 
analysis” with the onisegun (herbalist and native doctor) 
whom they regard as their traditional colleagues because 
of their intellect as well as extraordinary practical skills 
(Solomon & Higgens, 1995, p.276).
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
The Rationale for an African Epistemology: A Critical Examination 
of the Igbo Views on Knowledge, Belief, and Justification
112
However, certain claims of Hallen and Sodipo in 
their work have been disputed. A.G.A Bello (1988, p.94) 
for instance, rejected the radical translation situation 
created by the duo and the choice of onisegun, who 
though understands Yoruba, but not English Language 
and thus incapable of providing a correct translation. 
Hence, according to him, “the choice of onisegun is 
not particularly auspicious since they are not more 
qualified than other groups of Yoruba intellectuals. He 
then submitted that Hallen and Sodipo should have tried 
to identify persons with philosophical ability, that is, 
individuals who might or might not have had exposure 
to Western education, but should be richly endowed 
with Yoruba literary and folk culture, perhaps some 
combination of the akewi; babalawo, and onisegun (Ibid, 
p.98) will suffice.
Another critique of Hallen-Sodipo came from Moses 
Oke (1995, p.210) who, apart from pointing out the 
incorrect translations of imo and eri okon, disputed 
predicating the supposed Yoruba epistemology on 
empiricism. This according to him, is fraught with some 
problems bordering on the phenomenological problems 
of perception like illusions, hallucinations, mirages, after 
images and relativity of perception etc. Again, the other 
problem is how to reconcile an apparently subjective 
(idealist) epistemology with a practically demonstrated 
realist ontology (Ibid), since the Yoruba seem to hold 
that the external world exists independently of being 
perceived, that sense experience is the sole source of our 
knowledge of the phenomena of the world. It seems that 
Yoruba thought system is vitiated by the same problem 
afflicting George Berkeley’s esse est percipi (to be is to 
be perceived).
However, in order to ensure the continuous existence 
of matter or phenomena of the external world, it is 
necessary to tie it to the activities of the mind (okon). So 
even when sense-experience disappears, the human mind 
is able to remember and recollect what has happened and 
thus correlates the present and future experience with past 
experiences, that is, induction (Moses Oke, 2004, pp.25-
36). Equally problematic is the privacy of experience 
or solipsism implicit in Hallen - Sodipo. In order to 
overcome the problem of knowledge emanating from I 
and I alone without sharing my experiences with others, 
Oke (1995, p.214) suggested that rather than constructing 
“perception and empirical knowledge as “being private 
and subjective, it is better to regard them as socially 
and objectively grounded upon determinate conceptual 
schemes according to relevant epistemic contexts.
Apparently, Barry Hallen (1998, p.201) responded 
to Oke by saying that since Yoruba culture and African 
culture in general still depend on oral tradition, it is 
an “empirical observation that propositions come out 
of mouths.” According to him, given such a cultural 
environment the reliability of propositions may involve 
assessing the moral character of the person who is its 
source, whose mouth it issues from (Ibid, p.202). Hence 
the correlation of the epistemological and moral concepts 
in ‘Yoruba discourse’. Equally instructive in Hallen-
Sodipo is their desire to challenge the paradigm of 
Western epistemological concepts which hitherto have 
been taken as universal and which have stunted the growth 
and recognition of non-Western and indeed African modes 
of thought. This endeavour will assist philosophers in and 
around Africa to evolve alternative African concepts and 
categories which, albeit right in their own terms, are at par 
with Western concepts and categories on the cross-cultural 
scale of rationality (Ibid, p.203).
3.  UNIVERSALIST OR UNIQUE AFRICAN 
EPISTEMOLOGY?
3.1  Traditionalist Approach
Some African philosophers have proposed that there 
is a way of knowing that is uniquely African. This 
view is critised and rejected by some analytic African 
philosophers who argue that ascribing a unique 
epistemological ‘mindset’ to the Africans does not pulsate 
with the lived experiences of Africans (Udefi, 2005, 
p.74). What we shall do in this section is to analyse the 
respective views of the particularists who propose for a 
unique African epistemology and the analytic African 
philosophers who argue for a more Universalist African 
epistemological system. Of course their views here, 
in terms of their affirmation and denial, reflect their 
conceptions of philosophy.
The starting point or premise on which those 
African philosophers, particularly K. C. Anyanwu, I. 
C. Onyewuenyi and others based their argument for 
a distinctive or unique African epistemology is the 
proposition that each race is endowed with a distinctive 
nature and embodies in its civilization a particular spirit 
(Irele, 1981, p.70). 
Since, according to them, there are different mindsets, 
namely; Western mindset and African mindset, it would 
be presumptuous to assess African thought on the criteria 
developed within the context of Western cultures. It 
is their contention that how each culture interprets 
experiences can be explained by uncovering those 
assumptions and concepts which underline its experience 
and world-view.
For the protagonists of African epistemology, the 
dichotomy or lacuna that is said to exist between the 
epistemic subject and the object in the Western philosophy 
is absent in African thought. In fact there is some kind of 
interdependence and interpenetration of the self (man) 
and the external world, such that what happens to the one, 
happens to the other. This point is stated by Ruch and 
Anyanwu. Thus,
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The self vivifies or animates the world or mind so that the soul, 
spirits or mind of the self is also that of the world. The order of 
the world and that of the self are identical. What happens to the 
world happens to the self (1981, p.87).
According to Anyanwu the relation is not accidental, 
since in African culture, there is no sharp distinction 
between the subject and object. He argues, instead, that 
within the African cultural or historical situation, the self 
is the center of the world and hence every experience and 
reality are personal experience unlike the impersonal and 
scientific experience of the West. The kind of personal 
experience which Anyanwu alludes to here transcends 
reason, imagination, feeling and intuition in the sense 
in which Descartes used them as sources of knowledge. 
However, African epistemology, according to him, 
embraces all experiences derivable from different sources 
of knowledge namely; sense perception, imagination, 
intuition, reason, among others. The inability of Anyanwu 
to separate or categories experience with reference to 
the source of knowledge even when the subject and the 
object remain the same exposes him to attack (Roy, 1986, 
p.3). But the anticipated problem is ameliorated since 
Anyanwu (1983, p.60) holds a holistic view of knowledge 
which presupposes a unity of experience and in tune with 
African cultural assumption where “reality depends on 
personal experience and the world has meaning, order and 
unity by virtue of the living experience of the ego.”
The notion of epistemological monism implicit in 
the views of the protagonists of African epistemology 
might create the impression that the African cannot draw 
a line between himself and other objects in the external 
world. But on the contrary, the African knows that there 
is a distinction between him and other objects like trees, 
mountains, stones and wood. On this point, Ruch and 
Anyanwu say:
Because everything is a vital force or shares in this force, 
the African feels and thinks that all things are similar, share 
the same qualities and nature. (But) it does not mean that the 
African does not know the distinction between a tree and a goat, 
a bird and a man (1981, p.90).
Also, it is important to note that both the experiencing 
self, the object of experience and the cluster of forces 
intervening in the act of knowing in Africa is governed 
by the law of causation. Even though the African may not 
attempt to seek a rational explanation in all things like the 
Western man with a scientific cast of mind, he (African) 
is not impervious to such rational causal explanation. For 
instance, the African adduces a physicalistic explanation 
to explain the cause of a certain illness just like the 
Western man. However, in some cases he supplements 
this explanation with a reference to divinities, magic, 
witchcraft and other mystical powers.
The advocates of a unique African epistemology, 
it should be noted, anchored their argument on a prior 
conception of philosophy which they view “more 
contextually, that is, as expressions of the world-views 
and thought patterns of specific cultures (Hook, 199, p.12). 
3.2  Universalist Perspective
Turning to the Universal is t  or  analyt ic  African 
Philosophers, we see a passive acceptance or denial 
of the idea of African epistemology as propounded 
by its advocates. This attitude is not accidental but is 
informed by their background conception of African 
philosophy in particular and philosophy in general. 
Since the universalist group see philosophy as a 
rational and critical study of which argumentation and 
clarification are its essential hall marks, then it is only 
natural that they would reject as inadequate the idea of 
African epistemology since, as we stated above that this 
epistemology depicts the way the African responds and 
interprets events in his cultural environment.
In fact, the Universalist African Philosophers’ rejection 
of African epistemology can be summarised thus,
  i.  There are no distinctive cognitive principles 
belonging only to this or that society.
 ii.  Knowledge cannot differ from one society to 
another.
iii.  If we call something knowledge, then it is true 
for all people, anywhere, at any time.
 iv.  The criteria by which we decide the truth or 
falsity of a claim like, “it’s raining” (are) the 
same across cultural contexts.
  v.  There may well be ways in which communities 
differ with regard to the institution of knowledge 
but these are not epistemologically important.
 vi.  Epistemology, wherever it is practiced, is the 
same, and just as one does not find a distinctively 
Chinese or American or African mathematics, 
so, too there is no such thing as a distinctively 
African epistemology (Kaphagawani and 
Malherbe, 1998, p.206).
As stated above the universalist (analytic) African 
philosophers’ rejection of African epistemology is hinged 
on their conception of philosophy and its relevance which, 
according to them transcends the limits of the cultures and 
times of the philosophers who produced them, despite the 
fact that those philosophers were giving critical attention 
to the intellectual foundations of their own cultures 
(Gyekye, 2004, pp.23-24). 
Having seen the respective positions of the particularist 
and Universalist African philosophers with respect to 
the discourse of African epistemology, which, we argued 
above, are underpinned by their conceptions of philosophy, 
we think that it is pointless for each group to dogmatically 
insist on its position. There is need for some flexibility 
since there are both elements of particularity and 
universality in epistemological conceptualization. Even 
though the advocates of a unique African epistemology 
may have a point in contextualizing knowledge and 
rationality since there is a sense in which we can say that 
philosophical ideas and insights arise out of the historical 
and cultural experiences of a people, but the problem 
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here is that it will scuttle or undermine the possibility of 
exploiting the intellectual resources, ideas and values as 
well as institutions of other peoples. Again, ontologically 
speaking, our common humanity which presupposes that 
certain values, experiences and characteristic features are 
common to all human beings makes the position of the 
champions of a unique African epistemology unattractive 
and unilluminating. The universalists who urge, on the 
contrary, for the universality of knowledge, rationality, 
justification, truth and belief because all human beings 
“share certain basic values and perceptions” among others 
irrespective of whether they inhabit Africa, Asia or Europe 
are right since according to Kwasi Wiredu,” (1990, p.8) 
the frogs of Europe are the same as the frogs of Africa”. 
Similarly Steven Lukes (1967, pp.247-264) and Martin 
Hollis (1967, pp.231-247) had earlier argued that all men, 
irrespective of their historical and cultural circumstances, 
must accept the universal logical rules and methods of 
drawing inference since no rational man will affirm both P 
and not P (P→P) at the same time.
Also applicable is modus tollens
P           q 
P 
q 
Let us restate the point of our argument in this paper 
by saying that although there is an African epistemology 
just as we have African ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, 
political thought, African literature etc. to the extent that 
it reflects the cultural and lived experiences of the African 
peoples, but such epistemology cannot, by this factor, be 
said to be unique such that Africans are cocooned from 
any form of interaction with the rest of the world.
4.  SPECIMEN OF IGBO EPISTEMOLOGY
We now come to the examination of how the Igbo, an 
ethnic group in the South East Nigeria, conceptualize 
reality, that is, Igbo epistemology which, as we shall 
see, is not in contradiction or opposition with Western 
epistemology. In every epistemological system or study, 
one is bound to find such core notions as “knowledge, 
justification, truth, belief, ideas, intentions, explanation, 
understanding, experience and human action” etc. One 
term which encapsulates all these is rationality which 
again is found, one way or the other, in all societies and 
conceptual systems. Igbo thought is no exception to this 
since they attempt to validate their knowledge following 
certain epistemological cannons as found elsewhere.
The Igbo terms ‘amamife’ and ‘nchekwube’ which 
putatively translate ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’ in English are 
used to express their understanding or opinion of the facts 
in the world. Thus amamife (knowledge) is used by the 
Igbo to explain those things or events for which they have 
good reasons and which can be verified through common 
sense perception or observation. This is first-hand 
information since the person witnessed the events and 
is prepared to provide evidence and justification for his 
claims. Here justification is based on perception which is 
obtained through the five senses. So when the Igbo say ihe 
mfuru na anya ma uche kwado kwa ya (What I see with 
my eyes and which my mind or consciousness supports 
it), then they can claim to know it. Nchekwube (belief) on 
the other hand, is used by the Igbo to express those things 
which they accept on trust, faith and confidence for which 
there is no reliability or certainty. Such second-hand 
information like reports from other people are regarded 
as not reliable. However, the Igbo attitude to reports from 
the testimony or reports from ndichie (elders) Ozo (titled 
holders) and dibie afa (native doctors) is different since 
they regard such reports as true and reliable, though, 
derived from second-hand information.
5.  INDUCTIVE REASONING IN IGBO
It is important to state here that direct sense perception 
and testimony as discussed above do not exhaust the 
sources of knowledge in traditional Igbo thought. For we 
have inductive reasoning which is often ignored in the 
treatment of African thought. By inductive inference in 
Western philosophy it is meant a procedure in logical and 
scientific research in which we make judgment concerning 
a phenomenon or event from a mere observation of a 
particular fact to a conclusion covering a large number 
of instances or cases. Put differently the inference which 
is drawn here usually starts from a particular instance 
to a general law. The Igbo believe that past experiences 
provide sufficient ground to infer what will happen now 
and in the future. Also they believe that the external world 
exists independently of them (realism) and will continue 
to exist. This is the significance of their saying: Uwa 
ebi ebi (world without end). A two-legged goat that is 
presented to an Igbo man will obviously contradict his 
past experiences that all goats have four legs and hence he 
has every reason to doubt his present sensory experience 
and all epistemic beliefs based on it.
Another instance of inductive reasoning among the 
Igbo is exhibited when, as agrarian farmers, they observe 
that each year there is a long period of rainy season, 
which usually starts from (onwa anoo na afo ofu) month 
of April in the new year to (onwa irii) month of October. 
Having successively observed the cycle of the year 
including wet and dry seasons, they (Igbo) are able to 
plan their activities which include agricultural operations 
and ceremonies like the Ahajioku festival (New Yam 
Festival), which apart from celebrating yam as the king of 
crops, shows the rich cultures of Ndiigbo (Igbo people). 
What the Igbo man engages here is the use of scientific 
reasoning to arrive at certain conclusions in his world.
One thing that our discussion of the Igbo distinction 
between amamife (knowledge) and nchekwube (belief) 
has revealed is the relationship between amamife 
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(knowledge) and ezi-okwu (truth).What the Igbo claims 
to know is what, in the final analysis, is the case or true. 
So when the Igbo man says, amam na enwe bi na ofia 
ma buru kwa ezi-okwu (I know that monkeys live in the 
forest and it is true), it is taken that knowledge involves 
some element of truth. Hence the Igbo would almost 
equate onye amamife (knowledgeable person) with onye 
ezi-okwu (truthful person).
However the Igbo would not refer to onye asi (a liar) 
as knowledgeable and the reason is that both knowledge 
and truth are regarded as possessing divine and moral 
status. This is in keeping with their saying, ezi-okwu 
bu ndu (truth is life). So in order to verify the truth of a 
claim or event, it is not enough to see how propositions 
correspond with facts or the weight of superior logic of 
the argument but it is important to consider the person’s 
omume (character), that is, his moral standing within the 
community is paramount.
Even though, we argued above that nchekwube (belief) 
relies essentially on testimony or second-hand report 
from other people and is usually held on trust, and faith, 
but nonetheless can qualify as knowledge after deliberate 
effort to empirically test and corroborate the information 
obtained from them. The process of empirical testing 
and corroboration begins with a comprehensive 
examination of the proposition with what others have 
said and in accord with omenani ndi Igbo (Igbo tradition 
and custom). Thus the Igbo attach different epistemic 
certainty to experience or proposition. In other words, 
what someone experiences or sees with his eyes at first-
hand coupled with mind or cognitive apprehension of it 
is taken as a reliable way of knowing and is regarded as 
true (ezi-okwu). The next reliable is nchekwube (belief) 
which, though derived from second-hand information, is 
capable of being empirically tested and verified. However 
nchekwube (belief) that can never be verified is the least 
certain. There are occasions when the Igbo believe that 
the various ways of knowing may not be exhaustive, 
particularly when certain human problems are concerned 
like witchcraft, sickness, death, infertility and other 
forms of misfortunes. Here the Igbo attempt to provide 
explanation or justification by a recourse to (arusi) oracle 
and other spiritistic and paranormal ways of knowing, 
though the Igbo do not regard them as authoritative and 
unassailable system of truths. There is the temptation 
to accuse the Igbo of supernaturalism since they invoke 
explanation which is unreliable and inaccessible to 
scientific and empirical testing as well as transcending 
all epistemological canons. But this criticism is rash and 
presumptions since the Igbo perfectly attribute some 
death to natural causes like old age, prolonged illness etc. 
Also they know that certain sickness (oya) like malaria 
(iba -ocha) is caused by factors such as hard work (olu-
ike) or stress (oke-echiche) and as such begin a process of 
prognosis by administering some herbs and concoctions 
(mgbaraogwu) to cure them.
The attempt by the Igbo to appeal to spiritistic and 
human or personal agencies should not be dismissed with 
a wave of the hands, for what they try to do is to offer 
explanation (nkowa) on what seems to defy scientific 
solution like spirit (ghost) and witchcraft (amosu) attack. 
But we must state that this attitude is not peculiar to the 
Igbo and indeed African, for other societies, including 
Western scientific ones, exhibit similar kinds of belief. 
For instance people who believe in God offer prayers to 
him to intervene in their daily affairs, keeping at bay evil 
spirits and accidents as well as other misfortunes. Even 
Rene Descartes, a notable French philosopher, and some 
ancient philosophers like Thales and Pythagoras amongst 
others, appealed to God and some occult substances 
respectively apparently to establish some knowledge of 
the existence of the external world. So the invocation and 
consultation of oracle (arusi) for the validation of certain 
epistemic claims is in tune with their omenani (custom 
and tradition) which seems to agree with what H. H. Price 
(1967, p.49) calls the “volitional and emotional factors or 
cultural elements in knowledge validation”.
So the traditional Igbo thought (epistemology) cannot 
be dismissed as radically different from the Western 
ones because of its (former) appeal to non-physical 
forces,(English, 1999, p.86) oral tradition etc. which are 
unquestionably accepted. But this unquestioning attitude 
seems to characterize all human beings. As Godwin Sogolo 
(1993, p.87) an African philosopher from Nigeria, says,
Human beings are endowed with emotional attitude which 
allows for the unquestioning (attitude) based on the association 
of ideas. This acceptance is normally reinforced by the 
individuals psychological reaction to his personal experiences. 
This is not to be taken as a psychological deficiency. It is (rather) 
part of what makes us human.
The point here is that the Igbo and no less the 
Western scientific man could easily descend to this 
kind of psychological attitude of appealing to non-
physical forces in terms of validating their knowledge 
of events or phenomena which seem to defy common 
sense experience. For instance, the Western man, like the 
African, who was told on phone shortly after cutting into 
two with a sharp razor blade the paintings or photograph 
of his mother that she died, would, according to H. O. 
Mounce (1973, pp.147-162) easily accept that there is a 
connection between his action and his mother’s death. 
Whether or not this belief is justified is beside the point, 
the essential thing to note is that, that is the way human 
minds work”.
CONCLUSION
Let us conclude by saying that the Igbo make a distinction 
between knowledge (amamife) and belief (nchekwube) 
and there are procedures for validating the epistemic status 
of their claims which chime with Western epistemological 
canons. Even the appeal to non-physical forces by the 
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Igbo does not and should not constitute a deficiency 
since such attitude is noticeable in Western philosophy. 
Admittedly, there are cultural elements in knowledge 
and, again rationality has become an essentially contested 
concept” as there is now an increasing urge for alternative 
epistemologies and decolonizing methodologies (Smith, 
1999, pp.183-192). But this does not suggest that African 
epistemology is unique, rather it is universal since there 
is no radical difference between knowledge apprehension 
and epistemological canons across-cultures.
Thus the respective positions of the particularist and 
universalist African philosophers should be seen as borne 
out of the need to redeem African that was devastated 
during colonialism. The efforts of the particularist and/
or the ethnophilosophical school were according to 
Dipo Irele (2010, p.341) spurred by “the anxiety of 
the epistemic denigration of the African race, by the 
colonialists. But anxiety as used here by Irele may not be 
an appropriate way to describe the efforts of the precursors 
of African epistemology. Rather a more charitable thing to 
say is that they were motivated by the theoretical need to 
establish a basis for the discourse of African epistemology, 
notwithstanding their limitations (Sumner and Yohannes, 
2002, pp.54-64).
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